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Essences belong to the concept of being-in-itself. These beings—simple forms of existence distinct from humanity—have a clear purpose and innate is-ness that defines them. Being-for-itself stands in stark contrast to being-in-itself. Sartre proposes that consciousness “is characterized, on the contrary, by its decompression of being” (123). This means that consciousness is about unity rather than dualities. In the Introduction, Sartre reveals how dualities present a limited understanding of consciousness. For example, consciousness is not limited to the internal; it is the culmination of the external and the internal. Therefore, Sartre proposes that consciousness encompasses both belief and the consciousness of belief. Being is all-encompassing. This idea relates to Part I, Chapter 1’s description of nothingness. Many would view nothingness as the counterpart to being, but Sartre argues that it is synonymous. Both being and nothingness are existence; they are one. In this chapter, Sartre argues that the existence of the being-for-itself is the unification of many different dualities.
Sartre faces head-on the contradictory nature of consciousness. He begins by outlining what being-for-itself is not. Consciousness is neither presence nor is it immediate. By focusing on negation, he reveals how important this concept is to the understanding of consciousness. Existence is both defined by what it is and what it is not. Humans naturally move past negations, but Sartre wants to emphasize the role they play in human consciousness. Before Sartre can discuss what consciousness, or being-for-itself, is made of, he must first make sense of the concept through what it is not.
In the text, Sartre recognizes that cogito is an important element in understanding consciousness. He addresses Descartes’s famous line, “I think, therefore I am,” directly. The first part of the sentence is the cogito, connecting human consciousness to the ability to think. However, Sartre emphasizes that it is important not to overlook the second half of that sentence. Consciousness is of equal weight when it comes to existence for the being-for-itself. Descartes believed that humans needed to scrutinize everything because all ideas could be challenged by the limitations of human understanding. Therefore, his doubt was what constituted his consciousness. Sartre struggles with any concept of consciousness that requires a pre-reflective element. He offers the presence of self as a replacement for portions of Descartes’s theories.
Sartre challenges any form of reflective cognition, which contributes to his criticism of Descartes. One way to understand reflective cognition is to think of it as something that happens in reaction to something else. If a child falls and scrapes her knee, she might recognize the pain and begin crying. Her reaction is reflective. Sartre proposes that consciousness, instead, requires pre-reflective cogito: Humans understand their awareness before they ever think. They are born with an awareness of their own existence.
This chapter of Sartre’s work is considered one of the most challenging. This is partially due to Sartre’s attention to the contradictions in various philosophies of being and nothingness. Sartre argues that neither realism nor idealism can describe the full picture of consciousness. Instead, one must look at consciousness through the lens of its negation—it is not the being-in-itself. This is why Sartre chooses to open the chapter by defining what consciousness is not. He argues that one of the best ways to understand existence is through the negations which rule it.
Another challenge is Sartre’s treatment of pre-reflective cogito in comparison to a reflective existence. Sartre’s theories about pre-reflective thinking may appear to contrast with his ideas about essences; however, awareness and essence are not synonymous. Sartre is proposing that humans are born with a grasp of their own existence and that this realization does not require any form of thinking. This idea corresponds with the theme The Myth of Essence and Identity and the philosophical theory that humans are constituted by their ability to think and reflect upon themselves.
Sartre begins the chapter by acknowledging the organization of linear time and its distinct parts—past, present, and future. These three aspects of temporality are related to one another and construct the internal series of “nows.” Sartre breaks down the three ideas and examines common theoretical understandings of each. He then examines the ontology of temporality by looking at how time contributes to consciousness. For example, he rejects the idea that the past has ceased to exist or that it exists only in memory. Instead, the past is an inherent part of the present. Using this logic, Sartre can reconcile past, present, and future into one unifying idea of temporality.
One of the issues that Sartre sees with utilizing temporality is that it solidifies distinctions and dualities. If humans view themselves as living only in the present, we lose our sense of being and nothingness. Sartre’s analogy of the chair serves to clarify this point. Sartre paints the picture of an empty chair in a café. As a man waits for his friend, the chair begins to occupy both being (the chair) and nothingness (the absence of the friend). A singular approach to temporality places people in the solidified present; there is no longer nothingness attached to the chair.
Just as Sartre in previous chapters attempted to unify dualities like light and shadow or external and internal, his focus on temporality attempts to unify the past, present, and future into one phenomenon. One way to consider this idea is to think about time as a position in space. We can think of the “now” or the present as a specific position in space. However, even though a person may occupy that position, that person may also witness other objects and other points in space. Sartre suggests that time functions in a similar way. While humans may occupy a present, they cannot be separated from their past or the future—they are all part of the same theoretical space.
His critique of temporality reveals how the projection of a future places false meaning and purpose onto the present. Sartre also looks at social temporality—how society uses and thinks about time. The text shows how social temporality is used to justify domination by placing specific, goal-oriented pressure on the present. This idea is presented as a direct contrast to Marxism, which examines humans as part of a collective whole in a series of causal events. Sartre, in contrast, views time as a unified part of being, with no distinction between past, present, and future. The conception of time represents one of Sartre’s larger disagreements with Marxism, which emphasizes the overarching and objective view of humanity. Sartre’s philosophy utilizes the subjective and examines the individual experience instead.
Sartre proposes that linear understandings of time contribute to domination and the condemnation of freedom. By separating out time into distinct parts, humans can be made to feel that they have neither influence nor connection to the past or the future, as they are presented as separate entities that are just beyond their reach. In Sartre’s philosophy, freedom represents the ability to make whatever choices one would like based upon one’s own mind. The influence of linear time limits those choices by inflicting upon them external ideas about meaning. In social temporality, for example, a country may have specific goals that occupy space in the social future. Choices made in the present are intended to align with and advance those goals. Sartre’s approach to pluralities of temporalities means that one can define the future for oneself and recognize it as another set of “nows” that will occupy even more choices.
Sartre closes the chapter by expanding upon the multiplicity of time and how the past, present, and future all flow together and are unified. For Sartre, time has an ontological value. It is a part of consciousness in the same way that being and nothingness are a part of consciousness. He utilizes the example of the personal past to illustrate this point. A person’s past is their own, and it influences and contributes to their understanding of the present. A person cannot be separated from their past. Therefore, conceptions of time must be unified into a system of multiplicities.
In this chapter, Sartre draws a contrast between his approach to knowledge and consciousness in comparison to Husserl. He proposes that all knowledge is a form of intuition. Ideas like reasoning and deduction are merely tools for intuition. All consciousness must be conscious of something else. This form of knowledge endows the being-for-itself with consciousness. Sartre turns his attention to the relationship between the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself. When a person examines an object, their for-itself consciousness creates a distinction between the self and the object.
Sartre has already established the role of nothingness in being. Humans are constituted in their existence by nothingness, by the understanding of what they are not. The being-for-itself reflects upon the object and its negation—the fact that it is not the self—and this contributes to the consciousness of self. Without negation, the being has no consciousness. External negation is used to distinguish objects from other objects. This ability, or intuition, endows humanity with its distinctive version of consciousness. Here, Sartre makes a bold statement: Rather than denying the consciousness of the being-in-itself, he absorbs it into the consciousness of the being-for-itself. Consciousness is reflective: A person looks at an object and reflects upon it. The negation of the object contributes to the being-for-itself, but the negation of the self also contributes to the being-in-itself. Therefore, the being-in-itself is a part of nothingness and a part of human consciousness. The relationship between the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself is one of transcendence—Sartre uses this word to refer to inexhaustible movement from the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself. It is a form of the reflective-reflection: the cyclical cycle of understanding consciousness through being and negation.
This theory represents a larger trend in Sartre’s work of unifying ideas like the external and internal. Sartre establishes his position within the tradition of existentialist philosophy but refutes the idea that consciousness is tied to knowledge. For Sartre, a knowledge of the self, or cogito, that emerges simultaneously as existence is indicative of a philosophy that is dependent upon external force or divine essence, connecting to the theme The Myth of Essence and Identity. He argues that humans are born with awareness rather than knowledge of the self. Their awareness is dependent upon their perception and negation; they know that they exist when they see other beings.
Negation is central to Sartre’s argument throughout the text. His philosophy of being is dependent upon the existence of nothingness. Humans are made aware of their own existence by negation—through the understanding of what they are not. Humans know they exist because they see other beings—especially beings-in-itself—and know that these beings are not the self. The philosopher sees being as intrinsic to nothingness, and he also argues that consciousness extends beyond the self. It is all-inclusive. Consciousness is always consciousness of something, so it relies upon the existence of beings-in-itself to constitute itself.
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By Jean-Paul Sartre